Mary Ramirez v. Ogden City : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1954
Mary Ramirez v. Ogden City : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Paul Thatcher; Jack A. Richards; D. A. Alsup; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Ramirez v. Ogden City, No. 8233 (Utah Supreme Court, 1954).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2256
OCT 21 1954 
lAW i jjtijk 
Case No. 8233 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 




OGDEN CITY, a municipal corporation 




JACK A. RICHARDS 
D. A. ALSUP 
.Attorneys for Respondent 
J.O.WOOOY PRINTINII CO.,OIDIN, UTAH 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------- 1 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF POINTS -------- 7 
POINT 1. In owning, maintaining and oper-
ating the Wall Avenue C01mnunity Center the 
Respondent City was fulfilling a govern-
mental function in providing recreational 
facilities, and is not liable for Appellant's in-
juries suffered therein -------------------------------~---------------- 8 
POINT 2. The City did not lease the premises 
to anyone ------------------------------------------------------------------------20 
POINT 3. Erven if the City had leased the 
premises, still it is not liable, as it was, never-
theless, fulfilling a governmental function ____________ 21 
POINT 4. The City was not fulfilling a pro-
prietary function as to Appellant __________________________ 24 
POINT 5. The Authorities relied on by Ap-
pellant are either not in point or represent a 
minority view contrary to the established law 
of Utah --------------------------------------------------------------------------27 
ARGUl\iiENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8 
AUTHORITIES CITED: 
Alder vs. Salt Lake City 64 Utah 568, 231 Pac. 
1102 --------------------------------7·------------------------------------------9, 10 
...,.Beakey vs. Town of Bellirica (Mass.), 85 N. E. 
2d 620 ----------------------------------------------------------------------19, 26 
Burbidge vs. Utah Light and Traction Company 
61 Utah 96, 211 Pac. 691 --------------------------------------------22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Burton vs. Salt Lake City 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 
443 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------11, 29 
Chafor vs. City of Long Beach 163 Pac. 670 ________ 27, 28 
Crone vs. City of El Cajon ( Caifornia), 24 Pac. 
2d 846 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------17 
Curran vs. Boston 24 N. E. 781; 8 L. R. A. 243 ________ 19 
Davis vs. Provo City Corporation ____________ Utah 
____________ , 265 Pac. 2d 415 ----------------------------9, 10, 22, 28 
Day vs. City of Berlin 157 Fed. 2d 323 ________________ 19, 26 
Engles vs. New York 6 N.Y. Supplement 2d 436 ________ 28 
Fournier vs. City of Berlin (Vermont), 26 Atl. 
2d 366 140 A. L. R. 1054 ----------------------------------------------19 
Gebhardt vs. Village of LaGrange Park 
(Illinois), 188 N. E. 372 --------------------------------------------19 
Griffin vs. Salt Lake City 111 Utah 94, 176 Pac. 
2d 156 -------------·----------------~---------------------------------------11, 29 
Hannon vs. Waterbury ( Connecticutt) 136 Atl. 
876; 57 A. L. R. 402 --------------------------------------------------19 
Harris vs. City of Bremerton 147 Pac. 638 ________________ 22 
Huffman vs. City of Columbus (Ohio, 1943), 51 
N. E. 2d 410 ----------------------~-------------------------------------------10 
Husband vs. Salt Lake City 92 Utah 449, 69 Pac. 
2d 491 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 
Johnson vs: Board of Road Commissioners 
(Michigan) 235 N. W. 221 ----------------------------------------19 
Kellar vs. City of Los Angeles (California, 
1919), 178 Pac. 505 ------------------------------------------------18, 26 
Kelley vs. Boston 186 Massachusetts 165 71 
N. E1. 299, 66 L. R. A. 429 ----------------------------------------17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Kilbourn vs. City of Seattle (Wash. 1953), 261 
Pac. 2d 407 --------------------------------------------------------------------16 
Lemieux v;:;. City of St. Albans 28 Atl. 2d 373 __________ 10 
Lowe vs. Salt Lake City 13 Utah 91, 44 Pac. 1050 ______ 22 
Lunt vs. Post' Printing and Publishing Com-
pany, 110 Pac. 203 --------------------------------------------------------22 
Morgan vs. Shelbyville 121 S. W. 617 _______________________ _i9 
Orlando vs. City of Brockton (~I ass. 1936), 3 
N. E. 2d 794 ----------------------------------------------------10, 16, 26 
Pincock vs .. McCoy (Idaho) 281 Pac. 371 __________________ 22 
Prickett vs. City of Hillsboro (Ilinois), 55 N. E. 
2d 306 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------19 
Rhodes vs. City of Palo Alto 223 Pac. 2d 639 ______ 27, 28 
Ron1e vs. London and Lancaster Indemnity 
Company (Louisiana) 156 Southern 64, 169 
Southern 132 ----------------------------------------------------------------19 
Sanders vs. City of Long Beach 129 Pac. 2d 
511 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------27' 28 
Wilson vs. District of Columbia 179 Fed. 2d 44 ________ 17 
Wold vs. Portland 112 Pac. 2d 469; 133 A. L. R. 
1207 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------19 
W ordn vs. New Bedford 131 Mass. 23, 41 Amer-
ican Reports 185 ----------------------------------------------------------23 
STATUTE CITED: 
Section 11-2-1, U. C. A. 1953 --------------,---------------------------9 
TEXTS CITED: 
21 CJS "Courts", Section 209, Page 380 __________________ 23 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary ----------------------------------------------21 
CONOLUSION --------------------------------------------------------------------30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 




OGDEN CITY, a municipal corporation 
of the State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as appellant's statement of facts omits 
substantially all of the uncontroverted facts on which 
the Trial Court very properly based its judgment, the 
respondent is compelled to amplify the statement. Also, 
because the appellant's statement is not in chronological 
order and in some important aspects is highly formal-
ized and requires reference to the record for complete-
ness, it has occurred to the respondent that a chrono-
logical narrative statement of the facts might be of 
some assistance to the Court. For this reason and be-
cause the facts are relatively brief the respondent 
ventures upon a restatement of the facts even at the 
risk of some repetition. 
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The record con1es to this Court in three independent 
parts, each part separately paged. For the purpose of 
differentiating we shall refer in our stateineit to the 
Clerk's files of the pleadings, interrogatories and an-
swers, etc., as the "Record" abbreviated as "R". The 
reports "Transcript of Proceedings" will be referred' 
to as the "Transcript" (T); and the deposition of the 
plaintiff-appellant as the "Deposition" (Dep.). 
In this action the appellant sued the respondent cit)r 
for personal injuries received when appellant's rayon net 
dress caught fire when it brushed against a hot stove in 
the "Ladies Powder Ro01n" of the Ogden Community 
Center, a public recreational facility maintained h:· 
Ogden City. The controlling facts were stipulated at a 
pre-trial conference upon which the pre-trial order was 
based and at a subsequent further pre-trial conference 
held by stipulation and it was agreed by the parties that a 
law question only was presented to the Court for 
decision. (T. 4) The matter was submitted to the Court 
upon the agreed and uncontroverted facts and the 
Court then entered judgment for the respondent city, 
no cause of action upon the ground that under the facts 
it appeared as a matter of law that the defendant city 
opera ted the premises involved as a governmental func-
tion for public recreation and was therefore not liable 
for negligence or nuisance, if any, committed or main-
tained by its agents or servants in the premises. (R. 038-
039) This appeal is from that judgment. 
It must be noted that the appellant propounded 
interrogatories to the respondent city, which so far as 
competent were ans-wered under oath. (R. 014; 019) It 
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not challenged by the appellant and might be considered 
as a part of the basis for any motion for judgment made 
by respondent. (T. 4-5) Similarly, the appellant's 
deposition was submitted in evidence as a pre-trial ex-
hibit. (T. 5) The facts as stipulated or admitted to be 
unchallenged are briefly outlined as follows: 
Ogden City is a l-.1 unicipal Corporation of the State 
of Utah. (R. 030) The City acquired the premises in 
question on October 4, 1939, by deeds from Weber 
County which provide that the property "is to be used 
exclusively as a community recreational center." During 
the war the buildings (which were surplus Army bar-
. racks placed thereon by the Army) were operated by 
the U. S. 0. as a recreational center for Negro troops. 
Under date of November 20, 1944, the City leased the 
premises to the U. S. 0. for a term to end six (6) months 
after the cessation of hostility with Germany. (R. 019) 
The premises were surrendered by the U. S. 0. in the 
late Summer or Fall of 1946. At about that time a 
mass meeting of the inhabitants of Ogden interested in 
the operation of the center as a public recreational 
facility was convened and elected a "Board of Directors" 
for the Center and City Commissioner Thomas East 
designated certain other citizens to act as "advisors" 
to this unofficial board of directors. To this board of 
directors there was entrusted the active direction and 
management of the Community Center as a publis rec-
reational facility. In so acting Connnissioner East had 
no authority from the Ogden City Board of Commis-
sioners. (R. 031; 022-024). rrhis board voluntarily as-
sumed to assist and direct the operation of the Center 
as a public service rendered without obligation for the 
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benefit of the inhabitants of Ogden City. It had no 
legal authority, but directed the Director of the Center 
and its affairs only by common consent. No instructions 
as to the management WP.re given to the board by any-
one. This situation continued up to the time of the 
accident involved. (Ibid.) 
Except during the period when the Community 
Center was leased to the U. S. 0. it has always been 
operated "as a public recreational center, and all persons 
have had full leave and license to use the same at their 
wish and convenience as a public park or recreational 
facility, and the same has never been closed to anyone." 
(R. 020-021) The Center was available at all times to 
all of the people, who were free to go and use it when-
ever they wanted to do so, and the appellant understood 
that she was free to use the facilities there. (Dep. 20-21) 
From September 3, 1946 to November 1, 1946, the 
"snack bar" concession was granted by the City to a 
third party for a monthly consideration of One Hundred 
One and 00 j100 Dollars ( 101.00). Thereafter the snack 
bar concession was granted to another person for a 
consideration of Fifty and 00j100 Dollars ($50.00) per 
month, but this relationship was terminated prior to 
the year 1948. ( R. 031-032) 
Beginning sometime prior to 1948 the City received 
no revenue whatsover from the operation of the Center, 
as disclosed by the financial statement of the City's 
Director of Finance (Exhibit 1) which was stipulated 
to be a correct statement. (R. 031) It is most important 
to note that the City charged nothing and received 
nothing for the use of the Center which was available 
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to the public generally for use without charge as a 
public recreational facility. At the same time the City 
was spending some $5,963.30 to $7,349.63 annually out 
of public taxes to Inaintain the premises as a public rec-
reational facility. (R. 024; 031-032) There is absolutely 
nothing in the record anywhere to indicate that the City 
operated the Center as a business or for profit or in 
competition ·with any private business whatsoever or 
that it could possibly have been operated in the same 
manner by any private enterprise. Nor is there any 
evidence either admitted or proffered that the City 
leased the premises (and particularly the "powder 
room", where the accident occurred) to the Havana Club 
or to anyone else. It is true that the Director of Recre-
ation at the Center granted that club permission to give 
a public dance on another part of the premises and that 
she received Fifteen and 00 j100 Dollars ( $15.00) from 
the club which she noted as "hall rental", but (1) this 
was entirely outside of her duties as a director of rec-
reation, which were confined to the direction of rec-
reational activity at the Community Center (R. 031); 
(2) the arrangement was neither authorized nor ratified 
by the City Commission, which alone has legal power 
to lease public property; ( 3) the money was never 
received by the City nor was any report thereof made 
to any city official until report was made in response 
to inquiry in the course of the investigation of appel-
lant's claim; ( 4) the money was directly expended for 
recreational items under the general direction of the 
unofficial board of directors, and ( 5) the arrangement 
did not in any way affect the status or the powder room 
in which the accident occurred, which was in another 
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wing of the building~ and was as always open to all 
female members of the general public. (R. 022-026; R. 
024A; 031-032; Exhibit 1; Exhibit 4) 
Moreover, there is nothing in the record to show that 
any attempt was made to grant the Havana Club the ex-
clusive use of any portion of the Community Center or 
that any meinber of the public desiring access to any part 
of the Center would or could have been excluded there-
from. It is true also that the Havana Club charged those 
who participated in its public dance 75c per person, but, 
of course, liability on the City cannot be predicated on 
charges made by the Havana Club. It is also true that 
the Havana Club had contributed to the Director on three 
previous occasions during a five months period in con-
nection with its use of a portion of the Center for a dance. 
On the other hand the City was expending monthly a sum 
in excess of $575.00 for the maintenance and operation 
of the Center as a part of its public parks and recrea-
tional system. (Exhibit 1) 
The sums paid or contributed by the Havana Club 
to the Director, as well as other donations and the pro-
ceeds of other charita:ble fund raising activities conducted 
under the direction of the unofficial Board of Directors 
as shown by Exhibit 4, were expended largely for miscel-
laneous recreational items such as dominoes, ping pong 
sets, checkers, etc., which were n1ade available for use by 
the public at the Center without charge of any kind. 
(T. 12-13) 
On the night of the accident the appellant came to 
the Community Center, intending to attend the dance 
which was to be held in the south wing of the Center by 
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the Havana Club. She went directly to the powder room 
situated in the north wing and there the accident occur-
red. It is not contended that she or anyone else was ever 
charged for the use of the powder room or that its use 
was restricted to patrons of the dance sponsored by the 
Havana Club. 
At the further pre-trial hearing held at the time 
originally set for the trial the appellant conceded that she 
had no evidence to submit in addition to that already 
in the record in connection with the pre-trial to show that 
the City was engaged in a proprietary function and it 
was upon this record that the motion of the defendant 
City for no cause of action and for dismissal with preju-
dice was granted. 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
IN OWNING, MAINTAINING AND OPERAT-
ING THE WALL A VENUE COMMUNITY 
CENTER THE RESPONDENT CITY WAS 
FULFILLING A GOVERNMENTAL FUNC-
TION IN PROVIDING RECREATIONAL 
FACILITIES, AND IS NOT LIABLE FOR 
APPELLANT'S I N JURI E S SUFFERED 
THEREIN. 
POINT 2. 
THE CITY DID NOT LEASE THE PREMISES 
TO ANYONE. 
POINT 3. 
EVEN IF THE CITY HAD LEASED THE 
PREMISES, STILL IT IS NOT LIABLE, AS 
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POINT 4. 
THE CITY \YAS XOT FULFILLING A PRO-
PRIETARY FUNCTION AS TO APPELLANT. 
POINT 5. 
THE AUTfiORITIES RELIED ON BY APPEL-
LANT ARE EITHER NOT IN POINT OR 
REPRESENrll A .MINORITY YIE\V CON-




IN OWNING, :MAINTAINING AND OPERAT-
ING THE \VALL A VENUE COMJ\fUNITY 
CENTER THE RI1JSPONDENT CITY vVAS 
FULFILLING A GOYERNl\iENTAL FUNC-
TION IN PROVIDING RECREATIONAL 
FACILITIES, AND IS NOT LIABLE FOR 
APPELLANT'S I N J URI E 'S SUFFERED 
THEREIN. 
Although the City ~nterposed other defenses such 
as a denial of negligence or nuisance committed and a 
plea of contributory negligence and assumption of risk 
the City's motion 1nade at the close of the pre-trial con-
ference and the further stipulation of facts was based 
solely upon the ground that under all of the facts stipu-
lated or offered to be proved there was no showing that 
the City was engaged in a proprietary function in main-
taining and operating the Con1n1unity Center, but on the 
contrary under the facts as a 1natter of law the City was 
fulfilling a governmental function in providing recrea-
tional facilities and is therefore not liable for appellant's 
injuries suffered therein. 
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Under Section 11-:2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
the governing bodies of municipalities have since 1923 
been authorized by the Legislature to designate and set 
apart for use as playgrounds, athletic fields, gymnasiums, 
swimming pools, indoor recreation centers, or other recre-
ational facilities, any lands or build,i·ngs owned by the 
municipality and to equip, maintain, operate and super-
\'ise the same, employing such recreation directors, etc., 
as the governing body may deem proper. It is now the 
settled la:w of Utah, beyond any question, that the pro-
viding of public recreational facilities by a municipality 
is a governmental function where operated for the 
common good of all without the element of special 
corporate benefit or pecuniary profit and where the 
enterprise was not in competition with private business or 
was one which could not likely be operated as success-
fully in private ownership as in municipal ownership. 
It is equally well settled by the law of Utah that muni-
cipalities, when acting ]n furtherance of their govern-
mental functions, are immune from suit and are not liable 
for damages which 1nay be caused by the negligence or 
nuisance committed by their officers or employees. 
Davis v. Provo City Corporation, ______ Utah ______ , 
265 Pac. 2d 415; 
Alder v. Salt Lake City, 64 Utah 568, 231 Pac. 
1102; 
Husband v. Salt Lake City, 92 Utah 449, 69 Pac. 
2d 491. 
It is perhaps proper to ohserve at this point that the 
burden is on the plaintiff-appellant to allege and prove 
that the operation of the facility in question is conducted 
in a proprietary and not a govern1nental capacity. 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Orlando v. City of Brockton, (~la~~-, 193G), 3 N.E. 
2d 794; 
Lenrieux v. City of St. Albans, 28 Atl. 2d 37:3; 
Huff1nan v. City of Columbus, (Ohio, l:J-t-:3), 51 
N.E. 2d 410. 
The tests as announced in the Alder and Davis CasP~, 
·supra, are (1) whether the act or operation is for the 
co1nmon good of all, without the element of special eor-
porate benefit or pecuniary profit, and (2) whether the 
enterprise was in competition \vith priva:te business and 
one which would likely be operated as successfully in 
private ownership as in municipal ownership. 
In the Davis case, supra, the Court clearly announces 
that the great weight of judicial authority is that the 
maintenance of facilities for recreation is a public and 
governmental function, inasmuch as parks and play-
grounds are generally not operated by private corpora-
tions and there appears to have developed some duty on 
the part of the City to provide for parks and play-
grounds. It is obvious that. the same is equally true of a 
community recreational renter operated by the city for 
the unrestricted use and benefit of all the public equally. 
The law make·s no distinction between indoor recreational 
facilities such as ping pong, checkers or basketball and 
outdoor recreational facilities such as coasting or run-
ning or reclining on the green grass of a park. 
It is clearly established that if the primary purpose 
of any operation is governmental in nature, the fact 
that the city may charge smne small admission or derive 
some incidental benefit or income therefrom does not 
change the operation to a proprietary function. As this 
court very properly said In the cases of 
10 
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and 
Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 
443, 
Griffin v. ~alt Lake City, 111 Utah 94, 176 Pac. 
2d 156, 
the 1uere fact that a fee is exacted or a charge made 
is not conclusive against the City. 
Under the undisputed facts in thi~ case, it is very 
clear that there is no evidence that the City was engaged 
in a proprietary function, but on the contrary the evi-
dence establishes the City was engaged in a governmental 
function. It is agreed that frmn 1946 to the present time 
the Center has always been operated '• as a public recre-
ational center, and all persons have had full leave and 
license to use the same at their wish and convenience as a 
public park or recreational facility, and the same has 
never been closed to anyone." It is agreed that the City 
for approximately five ( 5) years prior to the accident 
had never charged and had never received one 
single dollar for use of this facility, as shown by 
Exhibit 1. At the sante time the City as shown by Ex-
hibit 1 was spending many thousands of dollars annually 
to maintain the Center tor the recreation of the public. 
Even while the same was leased to the U.'S.O. for the 
recreation of the military, the City was making some con-
tributions to the maintenance of this facility as a public 
service. See answer to Interrogatory 15 (R. 024). It is 
not shown that even years before the accident the City 
received any income or rental from the U.S.O. The only 
money the City ever received was in 1946 and the fore-
11 
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part of 19-17 when a very small return \vas received from 
the snack bar concession. However, it is clear that these 
receipts are so remote in ti1ne that they can have no bear-
ing on the nature of the operation on the date of the aeei-
dent some five ( 5) years or n1ore later. 
To apply the tests announced by this Court then, 
it should be very obvious indeed that under the undis-
puted facts the City wa~ rnaintaining and operating the 
prenrises for the cornrnon good of all without the element 
of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit and it is 
equally obvious that this enterprise was not in competi-
tion with private business and clearly was not one which 
could likely be operated as successfully in private owner-
ship as in rnunicipal ownership. What private business 
ever has or could operdte a recreational or amusernent 
center over a period of five ( 5) years without any return 
whatsoever and without attempting to get any return 
while it was spending an average of approximately $6,-
500.00 each year in the nlaintenance and operation of the 
center~ This is no business enterprise under any stretch 
of the irnagination. It is lOOo/o governmental and phil-
anthropic and absolutely without any purpose of corpo-
rate benefit or pecuniary profit. Even a private philan-
thropic institution rarely is able to make a free facility 
available indefinitely at an annual cost of $6,500.00, 
and any business which attempted it would be in 
bankruptcy forthwith. Such a function could not be 
operated successfully in private ownership or as a private 
business for profit. 
Appellant in her brief argues that because no offi-
cial action was taken by the City to assume and exer-
cise actual control over the day-to-day operation of the 
12 
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Community Center it could not have been acting in a 
governmental capacity and had to be acting in a pro-
prietary capacity and refers to the provision of the 
Council-J\lanager Charter of Ogden City providing that 
the powers of the City shall be exercised as prescribed 
by the Charter, or if not as therein prescribed, then as 
prescribed by ordinance. This argument seems utterly 
irrelevant. It could be applied with equal force in argu-
ing that the City had to be acting in a governmental 
capacit:~. In effect it says that because the City did not 
act at all it was acting in a proprietary capacity. If it did 
not act at all, it, of course, was not acting in either a 
governmental or proprietary function and it would not, 
of course, be responsible for any independent acts done 
either by an unofficial board of directors elected by the 
public or by the acts of an officer beyond the scope of his 
authority. 
In this connection perhaps a word or two should be 
said about the unofficial board of directors. It must be 
remembered that it was elected by members of the public 
using the Center and that there are no minutes of the 
City Comrnission or later of the City Council authorizing 
its election or authorizing any delegation of municipal 
power to this board. It is apparent from all of the facts 
that what happened was that the City upon making this 
recreational facility available to the general public deter-
mined that it could spend so much money to maintain 
and heat the building, etc., and to hire a director of recre-
ational activities, and that the citizens in the area then 
decided to organize in a cooperative way to assist in out-
lining the recreational program and to provide them-
selves with supplementary recreational facilities which 
13 
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the City did not furnish, such as checkers and ping pong 
games. It is apparent that Commissioner East gave the 
citizens so organized rather full latitude in the wa~' tlH'Y 
used the facilities which the City made available to the 
public. After the accident when an investigation was 
1nade it became apparent that they had extended their ac-
tivities into various charitable and fund raising activities 
for the purpose of supple1nenting the City's facilities. 
All of this, however, is something which was never au-
thorized by the governing body of the City and none of 
the money raised by the citizens through their coopera-
tive efforts was ever paid into the City Treasury. So 
.far as appears none of the officers of the City had any 
knowledge or infonnation of these fund raising activities. 
Certainly it received none of the funds and did not 
·pr.ofit therefrom in any way. The City's employee in 
charge of directing recreational activity assumed to 
handle the funds raised by the citizens through their 
cooperative efforts, but she obviously did not consider 
that they were city funds for she never paid them into 
the treasury and never accounted for them to the City 
until requested to do so in the investigation of this acci-
dent. It should also be noted that there is no showing 
whatsoever in this case that any person had to pay admis-
sion to use the facilities of the Wall Avenue Community 
Center, and particularly the ladies powder room therein. 
It may be that reservations of certain parts of the build-
ing were made for certain organizations, but there is no 
showing that such reservations gave exclusive occupancy 
thereof to the person or organization which reserved it. 
In fact- as near as can be ascertained the reservation of a 
po-rtion of the hall by a particular organization was com-
14 
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parable to a reservation of a certain section or certain 
tables of a park for a particular organization or family. 
rrhese reservations help to prevent congestion in having 
multiple recreational activities which might overload the 
capacity of the facility, but such reservations can confer 
no right to the exclusive use of a public recreational 
facility any more than the grant of a right to conduct 
a public parade on a public street could give the private 
grantees the right to exclude others entirely from the 
public street. 
The fact that the Havana Club may have charged or 
intended to charge admission to the dance which it was 
sponsoring at the Center is equally irrelevant. That was 
the act of the Havana Club and not of the City and the 
City neither received nor intended to receive any of the 
money. Apparently the purpose in charging admissions 
was to defray the cost of the orchestra, etc., but even if 
the Havana Club hoped to make a profit, that would not 
affect the character of the City's operation any more than 
the maintenance of Liberty Park would be converted into 
a proprietary function because some church conducted 
a fund raising picnic on the park for its own purposes. 
One might as well say that the City constructs and re-
pairs streets in the exercise of a proprietary function 
merely because it grants a license to a farmer to peddle 
vegetables on the street. The argument nmde in this 
case is equally unsound and illogical. 
Even if the City should be charged with responsi-
bility for the acts of the unofficial cooperative board of 
director~ or of the Havana Club in charging admissions 
to its dance, still it is entirely obvious that the overall 
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picture is one of a governn1ental rather than a propri-
etary function. The anwunts received and expended by 
the citizens cooperative group were insignificant as com-
pared with the an1ounts which the City itself spent in the 
maintenance of the Center as a public recreational fa-
cility, so that it is abundantly apparent that the City's 
operation was for the cornmon good without the element 
of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit and was 
an enterprise clearly not in con1petition with any private 
business or one which could likely be operated as suc-
cessfully in private ownership as in public ownership. 
As has above been indicated, the rece,ipt of some inci-
dental income is in1material where the primary purpose 
is governmental. In 
l{ilbourn v. Oity of Seattle, (Wash.,-1953), 261 
Pac. 2d 407, 
It was h~ld that the granting by the City of a conecssion 
to operate a refreshn1ent stand in a city for a percentage 
of the gross profits, under which the City received $40,-
000.00, and which was rnerely incidental to the primary 
park purpose where the annual operating cost was more 
than a 1nillion dollars, did not n1ake the operation a pro-
prietary function. In 
Orlando v. City of Brockton, (Mass., 1936), 3 N.E. 
2d 794, 
it was held that the sale of surplus products of a city 
poor farm does not change the operation to one of pro-
prietary character and it is observed that where a com-
paratively insignificant income or benefit to the city 
incidentally results frmn perfonnance of a public duty 
the don1inating public character of the undertaking is 
16 
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not thereh~~ ehanged, and the city does not thereby become 
liable for negligence of its officers or employees in the 
performance of such duty. In the case of 
I(elley v. Boston, 186 Mass. 165, 71 N.E. 299, 66 
L.R..A. 4:22, 
a dual function WaS inYolved. rrhe eity building housed 
the \Vater department which \vas a properietary function 
and other strictly governmental executive offices. It was 
held that the cit~T \Vas not liable for an employee's negli-
gence in the nmintenance of the building where the water 
department paid no rent to the city, and that the fact 
that the city derived an incidental gain from the water 
department whose offices were housed in the building 
did not convert the govermnental function of maintenance 
of a public building into a proprietary function. The 
prineipal purpose and function controlled. 
In the case of 
Wilson vs. District of Columbia 179 Fed. 2d 44, 
it was held that the District of Columbia exercised a 
governmental and not a proprietary function in main-
taining the municipal building, a part of which it allowed 
the War Department to occupy for a proportionate 
share of the expenses, and part of which was also used, 
rent free, for a cafeteria for the convenience of city 
employees even though the proprietor of the cafeteria 
was engaged in business for profit. The case at Bar is 
even stronger in favor of the City's position for here 
there is no showing that the City even knew that any 
other organization was charging for functions held on 
the. premises. 
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the defendant eity had for several yc>ars operated a 
swimming pool during the su1nn1er rnonths for the 
pleasure of its citizens. A snmll fee was charged for its 
use, but their total did not pa~· the cost of operation. It 
was held that the charging of fees did not under the 
circumstances convert the operation into one of a prop-
rietary capacity and that the city was im1nune frmn 
liability for negligence in the operation of the pool. 
In the case of 
Kellar vs. Oity of Los Angeles (California, 1919), 
178 Pac. 505, 
cited with approval by this Court in the Bttrton. case, 
supra, the plaintiff, a child, paid the defendant city 
$3.75 a week for board, lodging and care at the city's 
summer recreation cmnp. The cru:np was conducted 
pursuant to Charter power, to "establish, own, equip, 
maintain, conduct and operate ..... parks, playgrounds, 
gymnasiu1ns ..... and also any and all buildings ..... 
which are necessary or convenient to the health, morals, 
education or wealfare of the inhahitants of the city, or 
for their mnusement, recreation, entertain1nent or bene-
fit". While at the camp the plaintiff was injured and 
he sued the city alleging negligence. The California 
Supreme Court held that children's recreation centers 
maintained by a city for the general use of the children 
of the city, where so conducted as to partake in no de-
gree of the nature of a private business, do not differ 
substantially from a public park, and second, that the 
small charge 1nade to help defray the costs does not 
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Again the case of 
Day vs. City of Berlin 157 Fed 2d 323, 
1;:; particularly interesting here. It was there held that 
a ejty maintaining in its city hall a women's lounge and 
lavoratory, in which there were one free and two pay 
toilets, was engaged in a public or governmental func-
tion, and was not liable to one injured on her way to the 
lounge intending to use a pay toilet. r:J~he following cases 
also support the general proposition here advanced: 
Prickett vs. City of Hillsboro (Illinois), 55 N.E. 
2d 306; 
Gebhardt vs. Village of LaGrange Park (Ill 
inois), 188 N.E. 372; 
Johnson vs. Board of Road Commiss,ioners 
(Michigan), 235 N. vV. 221; 
Beakey vs. Town of Bellirica (Mass.), 85 N.E. 
2d 620; 
Curran vs. Boston 24 N.E. 781; 8 L.R.A. 243; 
Rome vs. London and Lancaster Indemnity 
Co. 156 Southern 64; 169 Southern 132; 
Fournier vs. City of Berlin (Vermont), 26 Atl. 
:2d 366, 1-±0 A.L.R. 1045; 
~'I organ vs. Shelbyville 121 S.W. 617; 
Hannon vs. Waterbury (Connecticutt) 136 Atl. 
876; 57 A.L.R. 402; 
Wold vs. Portland 112 Pac. 2d 469; 133 A.L.R. 
1207. 
It is respectfully submitted that on this record there 
is no proof that the Respondent Ogden City was en-
gaged in a proprietary function. The evidence con-
19 
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elusively shows the city was engaged in a govern1nental 
function. The city therefore not liable in this action and 
the j:udg1nent of. the Cou~t was proper and should be 
affirmed. 
POINT 2. 
THE CITY DID NOT LEASE ~rHE PREMISES 
TO ANYONE. 
The appellant in the forepart of her brief argues 
that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between 
Ogden City and the I-Iavana Club and attempts to 
predicate liability on that claimed relationship. This 
arguement fails to hold water for several reasons, the 
first of which was that there was no such landlord-
tenant relationship. The City did not lease the premises 
to the I--Iavana Club or to anyone else. True, the mern-
bers of the Havana Club had the right to use a portion 
of the premises that evening for a public dance, but the 
right to use the premisis they enjoyed independent of 
any lease with all other men1bers of the public, and not 
as lessee. 
Furthermore, there is absolutely no showing that 
the en1ployee of the City at the premises, the Director 
of Recreational Activities, had any authority in behalf 
of the City to lease the premises to the Havana Club or 
to anyone else. Her .duties under the agreed record were 
merely to direct recreational activities. Even if her 
action in granting license and permission to the Havana 
Club to conduct a dance in the south wing of the pre-
Inises were to be construed as a lease, the act was entire-
ly beyond the scope of her authority and no landlord-
tenant relationship between the City and the Havana 
20 
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Cluh could be predicated thereon. Again her action in 
granting the HaYana Club permission or license to use 
the premisi::; for a dance was not a lease. A lease is "a 
8IJecies of eontrad for the possession and profits of 
tand:-; and tenements either for life or for a certain peri-
od of time, or during the pleasure of the parties". 
H;mYiPr's Law Dictionary. 
As indicated, Ogden City could enter into a contract 
only through its governing body and there is no evidence 
that it did so. Furthermore, there is nothing in the re-
cord to show that possession of any part of the premises 
rather than mere permssion to enter and use the same 
ns members of the public was here involved. 
llloreover, the arrangement was obviously made not 
for the use or benefit of the City but for the benefit of 
the independent cooperative group of citizens repre-
sented by tLe unofficial board of directors for it is a-
greed that the money contributed by the Havana Club 
on the occasion was expended under their direction. The 
City received no consideration at all for the claimed 
lease contract. One could as logically contend that New 
York City operates the Brooklyn Bridge in a propriet-
ary capacity because a con-man sold the bridge to a 
visiting innocent. 
POINT 3. 
EYEN IF THE crrY HAD LEASED THE 
PREMISES, STILL JT IS NOT LIABLE, AS 
IT \Y AS, NEVERTHELESS, FULFILLING A 
GOVERN~fENT.AL FUNCTION. 
In her a.rgu1nent that the claimed relationship of 
landlord and tenant removes governmental immunity 
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enjoyed by n1unicipalities in Utah, as elsewhere, from 
this kind of an action, the appellant cites and relies on 
the cases of 
Davis vs. Provo City and Brigham Young Uni-
versity (Utah), 265 Pac. 2d 415; 
Lowe vs. Salt Lake City 13 Utah 91,44 Pac. 
1050; 
Pincock vs. McCoy (Idaho') 281 Pac. 371; 
Lunt vs. Post Printing and Publishing Con1pany 
110 Pac. 203; 
Harris vs. City of Bremerton 147 Pac. 638; 
Burbidge vs. Utah Light and Traction Company 
211Pac. 691. 
None of these cases are in point. In none of these cases, 
except the Davis case, was the· defense of governmental 
immunity raised or discussed and indeed in several of 
them no governmental unit was involved. In the Davis 
case the language quoted and relied on by the appellant 
here was used by this court only with respect to the 
claimed liability of the defendant Brigham Young Uni-
versity and was restricted to that application. The ques-
tion of the landlord-tenant relationship between the Uni-
versity and Provo City was not involved at all in the 
court's discussion of the governmental immunity of that 
City and the case thereof does not support the appel-
lant's argument. 
Moreover, in none of the other cases was there any 
defense of governmental immunity interposed and those 
points were not considered by the courts in any way. 
It is, of course, a general rule recognized by this court 
that a case in which a particular point is not raised or 
considered by the court is not authority for a point 
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which perhaps could have been raised. See 
:21 CJS "Courts", Section 209, Page 380. 
In the l\lassachusetts case of 
Worden vs. New Bedford -±1 American Reports 
185, 
the defendant city was actually engaged in renting 
rooms in its city hall for profit and for activities which 
had no relationsrip whatsoever with municipal affairs 
and wa~ collecting the rentals therefrom. The court 
there very properly recognized the distinction between 
governmental and proprietary activities and hold the 
city under these particular facts involved to be engaged 
in a proprietary activity. 
_Moreover, it is to be noticed that under the agreed 
facts the Havana Club was given leave to use the pre-
mises for a public dance. A dance is, of course, a proper 
recreational activity. gven if the City were to be held to 
have leased the pren1ises to the Havana Club for this 
particular purpose it would be a proper exercise of its 
governmental function in that it may use such agencies 
and procedures for the accomplishment of its govern-
mental recreation purpobe and the occasional charging 
of a small fee does not make the activity proprietary 
as has been shown by the authorities hereinbefore cited. 
The activity was still one for public recreation and the 
City's part therein was still a governmental function 
even if it had leased the premises to the Havana Club 
(which it did not) and even if it had received a consider-
ation for such lease (which it did not). 
In this connection it should be recalled that there is 
nothing in the record to show that the Havana Club 
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intended to operate its dance for other than purely rec-
reational purposes or that it had the Inaking money as 
even a seco?dary purpose in sponsoring the public dance 
in question. It, of course, had no right to any govern-
mental immunity for itself, but if it is to be assumed 
that it was acting as an agency of or for the City, then 
the function was govern1nental and the City was immune. 
It n1ust also be carefully noted that the arrangement 
with the Havana Club, whatever its character, did not 
in any way involve the powder roon1 in the north wing, 
the place where the accident happined. The powder 
room was always available without charge to all mem-
bers of the public, and those coming to attend the dance 
sponsored by the Havana Club had access thereto as 
members of the public and not by reason of any arrange-
ment with the Havana Club. This is 1nade abundantly 
clear from the fact that the appellant went directly to 
the powder room without ever having purchased any 
ticket from the Havana Club or made any other arrange-
ments with it. (Dep. 6 and 7) 
In any event the occasional leasing of the south 
wing could not in any wDy convert the overall operation 
of the ·Community Center, and especially the operation 
of the powder romn in the north wing, into a proprietary 
function. The cases cited under Point 1 of this brief 
make that abundantly clear. The City is not liable and 
the judgment of dismissal was properly entered. 
POINT 4. 
THE CITY WAS NOT F·ULFILLING A PRO-
PRIETARY FUNCTION AS TO APPELLANT. 
The appellant in her brief argues that even though 
the operation of the Cmnrnunity Center was a govern-
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mental function in general, it was proprietary as to ap-
pellant at the time and place and under the circum-
stances of the appellant's injuries. It is submitted that 
this argument has no valid basis either in fact or in law. 
Under the agreed facts the appellant was not 
engaged in any business transaction with the City. At 
the time in question she paid the City nothing for the 
use of any of the City's facilities and did not contem-
plate paying the City anything for the use of those 
facilities either in the powder room or elsewhere. She 
entered the premises as of right as any other member 
of the public could have done to use the comfort and 
recreational facilities which the City nmde available to 
the public as a governmental function. Under her own 
sworn testimoney she knew that she was absolutely 
free to do so. 
From the facts it is apparent that the City's role 
in the maintenance of the Community Center was indi-
visible. It was at a cost of $6,000.00 or $7,000.00 a year 
maintaining a public recreational facility for which it 
charged and received absolutely nothing. The City 
carried on no other function on the premises in question. 
Its relationship with the plaintiff-appellant was the 
same as with every other inhabitant, namely it was a 
sovereign exercising a governmental function for the 
health and general welfare of its inhabitants. 
Under the Utah cases and the cases from other 
jurisdictions hereinbefore cited it is apparent that the 
great weight of authority is that the test of a govern-
mental as against a proprietary function is "what is the 
principal purpose of the activity involvd", The fact 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the City may charge admission or derive other 
incidental income is immaterial if the principal purpose 
is governmental. This, we believe, is the general rule. 
Under this rule it is clear that with respect to the 
plaintiff, as with respect to other inhabitants, the City 
was acting in its governmental capacity and that this 
would be true even if it should be considered, by some 
stretch of the imagination, that the City derived an 
incidental benefit from the activities of the unofficial 
board of directors or of the Havana Club in raising 
money by various devices to furnish to the inhabitants 
supplmnentary recreational facilities such as checkers, 
ping ping games, etc. It can, of course, be assumed that 
anything that benefits the inhabitants of the City 
benefits the City itself, but that is not a benefit in the 
City's corporate or proprietary capacity and these in-
cidental benefits could not under the law change the 
City's function as regards the plaintiff who, at the time 
she was injured, had not yet even entered upon the 
activities conducted by th Havana Club or the unof-
ficial board of directors. 
The primary purpose of the City's activity controls, 
and the function is either governmental or proprietary 
as determined by this primary purpose. In this case the 
primary purpose of the City is clearly governmental as 
to the applicant as well as to all other inhabitants. 
Among the cases heretofore cited, which are particularly 
cogent in this consideration, are the cases of Orlamdo 
vs. the City Brockton; Beakey vs. Town of Bellirica; 
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POINT 5. 
THE AUTHORITIES RELIED ON BY APPEL-
LANT ARE EITHER NOT IN POINT OR 
REPRESENT A MINORITY VIEW CON-
TRARY TO THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF 
UTAH. 
Some of the authorities relied on by the appellant 
here have already been distinguished in the discussion 
under Point 3 of this brief. It is respondent's convic-
tion that the other authorities cited by appellant are 
equally distinguishable. In the California cases cited 
by the appellant, 
Rhodes vs. City of Palo Alto 223 Pac. 2d 639 ; 
Sanders vs. City of Long Beach 129 Pac. 2d 511, 
and 
Chafor vs. City of Long Beach 163 Pac. 670, 
California Statutes are involved which apparently to 
some extent remo~-e governmental immunity from the 
cities. The Chafor case was apparently decided before 
the 'California .l\runicipal Liability Act in question, but 
in that case the California Court concluded that a 
"public assen1bly and convention hall" constructed under 
statute authorizing cities to contruct and maintain such 
halls, which further provided that money derived from 
use or hire should deposited in the treasury to the credit 
of a public hall fund and any surplus might be used for 
general municipal purposes, was not a building main-
tained for a governmental purpose. This is quite. 
another thing from holding that a community recrea-
tion center is not maintained for a governmental pur-
pose and the decision of the California Court as to 
the convention hall seems proper under the facts there 
which are not the facts here. 
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The purpose was different. It is co1n1non knowledge that 
municipal convention halls are used generally for bus-
iness and "Chatnber of Commerce" promotions prima-
rily and to attract conventions and resultant business 
to the city. It is apparent too that the hall was there 
constructed for hire which is contrary to the fact here. 
The Chafor case is not in point. 
. The Rhodes case follows the Chafor case and 
applies the sa1ne doctrine of a convention or Ineeting hall 
to a community theater. Declining to find as a fact that 
the community theater was a recreational facility the 
court con1mented that "no matter where located nor by 
what agency ad1ninistered the building r.etains its es-
sential quality as a public meet·ing place." It is no dif-
ferent in that respect from the Long Beach Auditorium 
in the Chafor case. In the case at Bar, of course, the 
stipulated facts are that the Community Center is a 
recreational facility and in the Davis case and other 
Utah cases cited, Utah is firmly committed to the doc-
trine· that public recreation is a governmental function. 
The Sanders case was another municipal auditori-
um case and not a case of a recreational facility. The 
last two cases, moreover, were decided under the Mu-
nicipal Liability Law of California. Although it is not 
clear it . must be canfessed that the court in those coses 
particularly considered the significance of the Act. 
The case of 
Engles vs. New York 6 N.Y. Supplement 2d 436, 
relied on by appellant likewise is not in point. In that 
case the city itself was charging and receiving substan-
tial sums arid these charges included a charge for the 
hospital care of the patient whom the plaintiff was visit-
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ing. .Jloreover, the city received some $100,000.00 
revenue from the hospital facility which was not merely 
incidental to the operation but was an essential and 
integral part of the operation of the hospital asa whole. 
[n the case at Bar the City has charged and received 
absolutely nothing. Even if the Engles case were not 
distinguishable, it is against the great weight of author-
ity as disclosed by the decisions cited in the first section 
of this brief. 
The Utah cases of Burton vs. Salt Lake City and 
Griffin vs. Salt Lake Oi.ty, also cited by appellant, are 
clearly not in point here. The Burton case was decided 
on pleadings which with great thoroughness and part-
icularity alleged that the defendant city was. there in a 
proprietary function for profit and in competition with 
private business and in a business of a nature which 
could just as easily have been successfully conducted 
by private enterprise. In the case at bar the agreed facts 
show that the city operated a free public recreational 
facility without charge and which was a facility of a 
kind which was not in competition with private business 
and could not be successfully carried on as a private 
business in the same manner as it was carried on by the 
City. 
In the Griffin case the City charged more than a 
nominal price for admission; State and Federal tax was 
paid on admission; no one could get in except by paying 
and a net operating profit was made. The facts of that 
case clearly are entirely different from the one at Bar. 
In fact, none of the elements existing in the Griffin case 
exist in the case at Bar. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that under the agreed facts the 
City of Ogden in this case was, as a n1atter of law, engag-
ed in the governmental function of providing public 
recreation and that as such it is immune frmn suit for 
the negligence or nuisance, if any, cmnmitted by its 
officers or agents. It follows therefore that the judg-
ment of the trial court that appellant has no cause of 
action against the respondent city should be affirrned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER 
JACK .li. RICHARDS 
D. A. ALSUP 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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